UPEPA Decision Path Legal Viability
UPEPA07 Legal_Viability SectionDecisionPathLegalViability
LEGAL VIABILITY
Section 7(a). In ruling on a motion under Section 3, the court shall [dismiss] [strike] with prejudice a [cause of action], or part of a [cause of action], if: . . .
DISCUSSION
The technical discussion of legal validity, constituting the third and final phase of the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA) analysis, focuses on whether a cause of action that has survived the initial scope and prima facie hurdles can nevertheless be defeated as a matter of law. This phase recognizes that a plaintiff can harass a defendant with a claim that is legally nonviable just as easily as one that is factually nonviable. In this stage, the burden of proof shifts back to the movant to establish that the respondent's case is legally unsound.
The movant can prevail in Phase Three by establishing one of two distinct prongs. The first prong involves showing that the respondent failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. This is essentially a legal sufficiency test, comparable to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or a state equivalent. A common application of this prong occurs when a claim is barred by a definitive legal obstacle, such as a statute of limitations that expired before the complaint was filed, or the doctrine of res judicata.
The second prong of Phase Three tests whether there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This prong firmly ties the UPEPA analysis to the traditional summary judgment standard. By adhering to this established standard, the Act protects the right to a jury trial as found in most state constitutions while allowing courts to utilize decades of existing decisional law regarding when a factual dispute is substantial enough to warrant a trial. In practice, this often involves the movant asserting an affirmative defense that is so clearly supported by the record that the respondent cannot offer minimally credible evidence to the contrary.
For instance, in a defamation case, a respondent might satisfy Phase Two by providing an affidavit that a false statement was made; however, the movant could win in Phase Three by providing unrebutted, authenticated evidence—such as a public record of conviction—proving the gist of the statement was actually true. While Phase Three utilizes language familiar to summary judgment and dismissal motions, it does not replace those vehicles; rather, it allows them to be applied at the very outset of litigation, specifically in cases involving protected expression, to avoid the heavy emotional and financial costs of prolonged discovery. If the movant successfully makes a showing under either prong of Phase Three, the court is statutorily mandated to grant the special motion and strike the cause of action with prejudice.
The technical discussion of legal validity, constituting the third and final phase of the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA) analysis, focuses on whether a cause of action that has survived the initial scope and prima facie hurdles can nevertheless be defeated as a matter of law. This phase recognizes that a plaintiff can harass a defendant with a claim that is legally nonviable just as easily as one that is factually nonviable. In this stage, the burden of proof shifts back to the movant to establish that the respondent's case is legally unsound.
The movant can prevail in Phase Three by establishing one of two distinct prongs. The first prong involves showing that the respondent failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. This is essentially a legal sufficiency test, comparable to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or a state equivalent. A common application of this prong occurs when a claim is barred by a definitive legal obstacle, such as a statute of limitations that expired before the complaint was filed, or the doctrine of res judicata.
The second prong of Phase Three tests whether there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This prong firmly ties the UPEPA analysis to the traditional summary judgment standard. By adhering to this established standard, the Act protects the right to a jury trial as found in most state constitutions while allowing courts to utilize decades of existing decisional law regarding when a factual dispute is substantial enough to warrant a trial. In practice, this often involves the movant asserting an affirmative defense that is so clearly supported by the record that the respondent cannot offer minimally credible evidence to the contrary.
For instance, in a defamation case, a respondent might satisfy Phase Two by providing an affidavit that a false statement was made; however, the movant could win in Phase Three by providing unrebutted, authenticated evidence—such as a public record of conviction—proving the gist of the statement was actually true. While Phase Three utilizes language familiar to summary judgment and dismissal motions, it does not replace those vehicles; rather, it allows them to be applied at the very outset of litigation, specifically in cases involving protected expression, to avoid the heavy emotional and financial costs of prolonged discovery. If the movant successfully makes a showing under either prong of Phase Three, the court is statutorily mandated to grant the special motion and strike the cause of action with prejudice.
EXEMPLARY OPINIONS
In Cook v. Trimble, the Minnesota Court of Appeals provided a definitive application of the Phase Three legal viability standard, particularly regarding the interplay between factual allegations and absolute legal bars. After navigating the initial hurdles of scope and prima facie evidence, the court’s analysis pivoted to whether certain claims were "legally sound" or precluded by established law.
The court specifically examined defamation claims arising from two sources: an unsealed memorandum filed with the court and various media statements. In applying the legal viability test, the court identified that Minnesota's judicial-proceedings privilege acted as an absolute bar to the claims involving the memorandum. Even though the plaintiff, Cook, found the unveiling of the memorandum offensive, the court determined as a matter of law that the privilege attached to the document’s contents. Because this privilege rendered the claim legally nonviable, the court held that these specific defamation claims should have been dismissed under the UPEPA special motion.
For the media statements, which were not protected by the same privilege, the court shifted its focus to the "no genuine issue of material fact" prong of Phase Three. The court noted that to survive, Cook was required to overcome the high legal bar of showing malice with clear and convincing evidence. Upon reviewing the record evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent, the court found that Cook had failed to meet this burden. Consequently, because there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the necessary element of malice, the movants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
This ruling highlights the "weeding out" function of Phase Three: it allows a court to terminate claims that may have enough factual padding to appear viable in Phase Two but ultimately fail when tested against rigorous legal standards like privilege or summary judgment-level evidentiary requirements. By reversing the lower court's denial, the appellate court ensured that the defendants were not forced to endure the "expense and emotional angst" of further litigation on claims that were legally destined for dismissal.
LEGAL VIABILITY OPINIONS