Hawaii Anti-SLAPP Laws Acts UPEPA
Hawaii Hawaii HawaiiAntiSlappActsLaws
Hawaii Public Expression Protection Act
HRS § ___ -1. Short Title
This chapter may be cited as the Hawaii Public Expression Protection Act.
HRS § ___ -2. Scope of chapter
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), this chapter shall apply to a cause of action asserted against a person based on the person's:
(b) This chapter shall not apply to a cause of action asserted:
(c) As used in this section:
HRS § ___ -3 . Required procedures; motions; stays
(a) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, including rules of the court, no later than sixty days after a party is served with a complaint, crossclaim, counterclaim, third-party claim, or other pleading that asserts a cause of action to which this chapter applies, or at a later time on a showing of good cause, the party may file a special motion to dismiss the cause of action or part of the cause of action.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section:
(c) A stay under subsection (b) shall remain in effect until entry of an order ruling on the motion filed under subsection (a) and the expiration of the time to appeal the order.
(d) If a party appeals from an order ruling on a motion filed under subsection (a), all proceedings between all parties in an action shall be stayed. The stay shall remain in effect until the conclusion of the appeal.
(e) During a stay under subsection (b), the court may allow limited discovery if a party shows that specific information is necessary to establish whether a party has satisfied or failed to satisfy the burden imposed by section -6(a) and is not reasonably available without discovery.
(f) A motion for costs and expenses under section -9 shall not be subject to a stay under this section.
(g) A stay under this section shall not affect a party's ability to voluntarily dismiss a cause of action or part of a cause of action or move to sever a cause of action.
(h) During a stay under this section, the court for good cause may hear and rule on a motion:
HRS § ___ -4. Expedited hearings
(a) The court shall hear a motion under section -3(a) no later than sixty days after filing of the motion, unless the court orders a later hearing:
(b) If the court orders a later hearing under subsection (a)(1), the court shall hear the motion under section -3(a) no later than sixty days after the court order allowing the discovery, subject to subsection (a)(2).
HRS § ___ -5. Evidence
In ruling on a motion under section -3(a), the court shall consider the parties' pleadings, the motion, any replies and responses to the motion, and any evidence that could be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment under the applicable Hawaii rules of civil procedure.
HRS § ___ -6. Dismissal of cause of action
(a) In ruling on a motion under section -3(a), the court shall dismiss with prejudice a cause of action or part of a cause of action if:
(b) A voluntary dismissal without prejudice of a responding party's cause of action, or part of a cause of action, that is the subject of a motion under section -3(a) shall not affect a moving party's right to obtain a ruling on the motion and seek costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and reasonable litigation expenses under section -9.
(c) A voluntary dismissal with prejudice of a responding party's cause of action, or part of a cause of action, that is the subject of a motion under section -3(a) shall establish for the purpose of section -9 that the moving party prevailed on the motion.
HRS § ___ -7. Court ruling
The court shall rule on a motion under section -3(a) no later than sixty days after the hearing under section -4.
HRS § ___ -8. Appeal
A moving party may appeal within thirty days as a matter of right from an order denying, in whole or in part, a motion under section -3(a).
HRS § ___ -9. Costs, attorney's fees, and expenses
On a motion under section -3(a) the court shall award costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and reasonable litigation expenses related to the motion:
HRS § ___ -10. Rule of construction
This chapter shall be construed liberally to fully effectuate its purposes and intent to protect the exercise of the right of freedom of speech and of the press, the right to assemble and petition, and the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or Hawaii State Constitution.
HRS § ___ -11. Uniformity of application and construction
In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration shall be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.
Hawaii Opinions
RCA Trade Center, Inc. v. Hu, 2026 WL 1802987 (Ha.App., June 23, 2026).
♦ the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i affirmed a circuit court's final judgment dismissing a complaint against Wayne and Tara Hu pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes Chapter 634G, the Hawai'i Public Expression Protection Act (HPEPA). The litigation arose after the Hus transmitted a 52-page letter to the plaintiffs and ten governmental agencies expressing environmental and zoning concerns over the plaintiffs' construction and commercial use of eight pre-fabricated steel warehouses within an agricultural condominium project. This letter prompted the plaintiffs' lender to temporarily halt loan draws and declare a default, leading the plaintiffs to sue for declaratory relief, tortious interference with contractual relations, and injunctive relief. On appeal, the court first held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by finding good cause for the Hus' late filing of their HPEPA motion, as the parties had implicitly agreed to delay proceedings while the Hus unsuccessfully sought an insurance defense. Reviewing the substantive dismissal de novo, the court determined that HPEPA applied because the Hus' letter involved a matter of public concern regarding coastal environments and land-use regulations. The burden then shifted to the plaintiffs, who failed to establish that any statutory exemptions applied or to present a prima facie case for their claims. Specifically, the declaratory relief claim failed to join indispensable state or county regulatory agencies; the tortious interference claim lacked evidence showing the Hus' conduct regarding warehouse usage was unjustified; and the injunctive relief claim lacked requisite proof concerning irreparable harm and public interest. Finally, the court deemed the plaintiffs' challenge to the award of attorney's fees waived due to a failure to present supporting arguments in their opening brief. ♦
Hallums v. Alston, 2026 WL 1905523 (Ha.App., July 2, 2026).
♦ David Hallums, a police officer and union vice-president, filed a tort action against attorneys Paul Alston and Galen Chee after Chee sent letters to the Honolulu Police Department reporting Hallums’s alleged unauthorized use of paid leave and requesting an internal investigation. Alston and Chee filed a special motion to dismiss under the Hawaii Public Expression Protection Act (HPEPA), HRS Ch. 634 and moved for sanctions under HRCP Rule 11. The First Circuit Court granted the HPEPA motion and awarded mandatory attorney's fees, but summarily denied the Rule 11 motion, stating it gave plaintiff's counsel the "benefit of the doubt." On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i unanimously affirmed the HPEPA dismissal and fee award, holding that Alston and Chee met their initial burden to show HPEPA applied under HRS 634 because the letters constituted an exercise of the constitutional right to petition the government on a matter of public concern (police misconduct). Because Hallums failed to present a prima facie case demonstrating the legal or factual viability of his claims, dismissal with prejudice and an award of reasonable attorney's fees under HRS 634 were required. However, the appellate court split on the cross-appeal regarding sanctions; the majority vacated the order denying the Rule 11 motion and remanded the issue for a full rehearing before a new judge (due to the original trial judge's retirement), holding that the circuit court acted outside its discretion by failing to provide specific findings of fact or a sufficiently detailed explanation to permit meaningful appellate review. Dissenting in part, Judge Leonard argued that HRCP Rule 11(c)(3) explicitly requires a detailed order only when imposing sanctions, and that the trial court's oral rationale of giving counsel the benefit of the doubt fell well within its broad discretion. ♦
