Washington Anti-SLAPP Laws Acts UPEPA

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Washington Anti-SLAPP Acts & Laws

Last updated 2021-5-30

RCW 4.105.010. Application of chapter

(1) In this section:

(a) “Goods or services” does not include the creation, dissemination, exhibition, or advertisement or similar promotion of a dramatic, literary, musical, political, journalistic, or artistic work.

(b) “Governmental unit” means a public corporation or government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality.

(c) “Person” means an individual, estate, trust, partnership, business or nonprofit entity, governmental unit, or other legal entity.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, this chapter applies to a cause of action asserted in a civil action against a person based on the person’s:

(a) Communication in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding;

(b) Communication on an issue under consideration or review in a legislative, executive, judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding;

(c) Exercise of the right of freedom of speech or of the press, the right to assemble or petition, or the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or Washington state Constitution, on a matter of public concern.

(3)

(a) Except when (b) of this subsection applies, this chapter does not apply to a cause of action asserted:

(i) Against a governmental unit or an employee or agent of a governmental unit acting or purporting to act in an official capacity;

(ii) By a governmental unit or an employee or agent of a governmental unit acting in an official capacity to enforce a law to protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety;

(iii) Against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or services if the cause of action arises out of a communication related to the person’s sale or lease of the goods or services;

(iv) Against a person named in a civil suit brought by a victim of a crime against a perpetrator;

(v) Against a person named in a civil suit brought to establish or declare real property possessory rights, use of real property, recovery of real property, quiet title to real property, or related claims relating to real property;

(vi) Seeking recovery for bodily injury, wrongful death, or survival or to statements made regarding that legal action, unless the claims involve damage to reputation;

(vii) Brought under the insurance code or arising out of an insurance contract;

(viii) Based on a common law fraud claim;

(ix) Brought under Title 26 RCW, or counterclaims based on a criminal no-contact order pursuant to chapter 10.99 RCW, for or based on an antiharassment order under *chapter 10.14 RCW or RCW 9A.46.050, for or based on a sexual assault protection order under *chapter 7.90 RCW, or for or based on a vulnerable adult protection order under chapter 74.34 RCW;

(x) Brought under Title 49 RCW; negligent supervision, retention, or infliction of emotional distress unless the claims involve damage to reputation; wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; whistleblowing, including chapters 42.40 and 42.41 RCW; or enforcement of employee rights under civil service, collective bargaining, or handbooks and policies;

(xi) Brought under the consumer protection act, chapter 19.86 RCW; or

(xii) Any claim brought under federal law.

(b) This chapter applies to a cause of action asserted under (a)(iii), (viii), or (xi) of this subsection when the cause of action is:

(i) A legal action against a person arising from any act of that person, whether public or private, related to the gathering, receiving, posting, or processing of information for communication to the public, whether or not the information is actually communicated to the public, for the creation, dissemination, exhibition, or advertisement or other similar promotion of a dramatic, literary, musical, political, journalistic, or otherwise artistic work, including audio-visual work regardless of the means of distribution, a motion picture, a television or radio program, or an article published in a newspaper, website, magazine, or other platform, no matter the method or extent of distribution; or

(ii) A legal action against a person related to the communication, gathering, receiving, posting, or processing of consumer opinions or commentary, evaluations of consumer complaints, or reviews or ratings of businesses.

OFFICIAL NOTES *Reviser’s note: Chapters 7.90 and 10.14 RCW were repealed by 2021 c 215 § 170, effective July 1, 2022. For later enactment, see chapter 7.105 RCW.

RCW 4.105.020. Special motion for expedited relief

(1) Prior to filing a special motion for expedited relief under subsection (2) of this section, the moving party shall provide written notice to the responding party of its intent to file the motion at least 14 days prior to filing the motion. During that time, the responding party may withdraw or amend the pleading in accordance with applicable court rules, but shall otherwise comply with the stay obligations listed in RCW 4.105.030. If the moving party fails to provide the notice required under this subsection, such failure shall not affect the moving party’s right to relief under this chapter, but the moving party shall not be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees under RCW 4.105.090.

(2) Not later than sixty days after a party is served with a complaint, cross-claim, counterclaim, third-party claim, or other pleading that asserts a cause of action to which this chapter applies, or at a later time on a showing of good cause, the party may file a special motion for expedited relief to dismiss the cause of action or part of the cause of action.

RCW 4.105.030. Stay

(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (4) through (7) of this section, on the earlier of the giving of notice of intent to file a motion under RCW 4.105.020(1) or the filing of a motion under RCW 4.105.020(2):

(a) All other proceedings between the moving party and responding party, including discovery and a pending hearing or motion, are stayed; and

(b) On motion by the moving party, the court may stay a hearing or motion involving another party, or discovery by another party, if the hearing or ruling on the motion would adjudicate, or the discovery would relate to, an issue material to the motion under RCW 4.105.020.

(2) A stay under subsection (1) of this section remains in effect until entry of an order ruling on the motion under RCW 4.105.020 and expiration of the time under RCW 4.105.080 for the moving party to appeal the order.

(3) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (5), (6), and (7) of this section, if a party appeals from an order ruling on a motion under RCW 4.105.020, all proceedings between all parties in the action are stayed. The stay remains in effect until the conclusion of the appeal.

(4) During a stay under subsection (1) of this section, the court may allow limited discovery if a party shows that specific information is necessary to establish whether a party has satisfied or failed to satisfy a burden under RCW 4.105.060(1) and the information is not reasonably available unless discovery is allowed.

(5) A motion under RCW 4.105.090 for costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses is not subject to a stay under this section.

(6) A stay under this section does not affect a party’s ability voluntarily to dismiss a cause of action or part of a cause of action or move to sever a cause of action.

(7) During a stay under this section, the court for good cause may hear and rule on:

(a) A motion unrelated to the motion under RCW 4.105.020; and

(b) A motion seeking a special or preliminary injunction to protect against an imminent threat to public health or safety.

RCW 4.105.040. Hearing

(1) The court shall hear a motion under RCW 4.105.020 not later than sixty days after filing of the motion, unless the court orders a later hearing:

(a) To allow discovery under RCW 4.105.030(4); or

(b) For other good cause.

(2) If the court orders a later hearing under subsection (1)(a) of this section, the court shall hear the motion under RCW 4.105.020 not later than sixty days after the court order allowing the discovery, unless the court orders a later hearing under subsection (1)(b) of this section.

RCW 4.105.050. Proof

In ruling on a motion under RCW 4.105.020, the court shall consider the pleadings, the motion, any reply or response to the motion, and any evidence that could be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment under superior court civil rule 56.

RCW 4.105.060. Dismissal of cause of action in whole or part

(1) In ruling on a motion under RCW 4.105.020, the court shall dismiss with prejudice a cause of action, or part of a cause of action, if:

(a) The moving party establishes under RCW 4.105.010(2) that this chapter applies;

(b) The responding party fails to establish under RCW 4.105.010(3) that this chapter does not apply; and

(i) The responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of the cause of action; or

(ii) The moving party establishes that:

(A) The responding party failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted; or

(B) There is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the cause of action or part of the cause of action.

(2) A voluntary dismissal without prejudice of a responding party’s cause of action, or part of a cause of action, that is the subject of a motion under RCW 4.105.020 does not affect a moving party’s right to obtain a ruling on the motion and seek costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses under RCW 4.105.090.

(3) A voluntary dismissal with prejudice of a responding party’s cause of action, or part of a cause of action, that is the subject of a motion under RCW 4.105.020 establishes for the purpose of RCW 4.105.090 that the moving party prevailed on the motion.

RCW 4.105.070. Ruling

The court shall rule on a motion under RCW 4.105.020 not later than sixty days after a hearing under RCW 4.105.040.

RCW 4.105.080. Appeal

A moving party may appeal as a matter of right from an order denying, in whole or in part, a motion under RCW 4.105.020. The appeal must be filed not later than twenty-one days after entry of the order.

RCW 4.105.090. Costs, attorneys’ fees, and expenses

On a motion under RCW 4.105.020, the court shall award court costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and reasonable litigation expenses related to the motion:

(1) To the moving party if the moving party prevails on the motion; or

(2) To the responding party if the responding party prevails on the motion and the court finds that the motion was not substantially justified or filed solely with intent to delay the proceeding.

RCW 4.105.900. Short title

This chapter may be known and cited as the uniform public expression protection act.

RCW 4.105.901. Construction

This chapter must be broadly construed and applied to protect the exercise of the right of freedom of speech and of the press, the right to assemble and petition, and the right of association, guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the Washington state Constitution.

RCW 4.105.902. Uniformity of application and construction

In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.

RCW 4.105.903. Application--Transitional provision

This chapter applies to a civil action filed or cause of action asserted in a civil action on or after July 25, 2021.

ARTICLES

2021.04.30 ... Washington State Legislature Passes The Uniform Public Expression Protection Act

Washington Opinions

Law Office of John Randolph, PLLC v. EWU Media LLC, 2026 WL 1283569 (Wash.App.Div. 1, May 11, 2026).
♦ The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1, affirmed the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss filed under the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA). This legal battle began after EWU Media published a video on YouTube and Facebook in 2023, which utilized police bodycam and security footage from a 2021 incident involving attorney John Randolph. During that earlier incident, Randolph, who suffers from bipolar disorder, experienced a manic episode at a public park where he inappropriately approached a child and claimed to be the child’s father. Although the matter originally resulted in a simple guilty plea for disturbing the peace, the EWU Media video featured dramatic narration alleging that Randolph was hiding a disgusting secret and had a tumultuous past. The narrator described him as a ticking time bomb who could relapse at any moment, leading many viewers to label him a pedophile. This public backlash forced Randolph to close his law practice and change his name, prompting him to sue for defamation and false light. EWU Media moved for an expedited dismissal under UPEPA, claiming the video addressed a matter of public concern and was protected opinion. However, the appellate court ruled that while the core incident was of public concern, the added narration implied the existence of undisclosed false facts regarding a history of child predation. Because these implications were not supported by the official record and the fair reporting privilege did not cover statements attributed to anonymous sources, the court found that genuine questions of material fact remained. The court concluded that the sting of the narration potentially caused harm distinct from the true footage, thus upholding the trial court's decision to allow the lawsuit to proceed toward trial. ♦

Button v. Jimison, 2026 WL 149016 (W.D.Wa., Jan. 20, 2026).
♦ The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted Defendant John Jimison's special motion for expedited relief under Washington's Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA) in a defamation case brought by Mitchell and Dusty Button. The lawsuit centered on an Instagram post by Jimison sharing a news article about sexual abuse allegations against the Buttons. The Court held that the Plaintiffs' claims for defamation, false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference, and civil conspiracy were barred by the statute of limitations because the Buttons failed to act diligently by filing against a "John Doe" defendant while seeking to identify the anonymous account owner. Additionally, the Court found that even if the claims were timely, Jimison's post was protected by the fair report privilege and the Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case for any cause of action. The Court also struck several of the Buttons' filings for repeatedly utilizing fictitious case citations generated by artificial intelligence, despite explicit prior warnings. The case was dismissed with prejudice, and Jimison was awarded court costs and attorney fees as the prevailing party. ♦

Valve Corp. v. Bucher Law PLLC, 2025 WL 1792620 (Wash.App., June 30, 2025). UPEPA Anti-SLAPP
♦ The Washington Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss filed by Bucher Law PLLC and AFN Law PLLC. Valve Corporation had sued the law firms for tortious interference and abuse of process, alleging they improperly used Valve's "Steam" platform's dispute resolution agreement to pursue claims on behalf of thousands of customers. The appellate court found that the law firms' actions were protected by Washington's Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), an anti-SLAPP statute. UPEPA applies to lawsuits targeting activities protected by the First Amendment, such as petitioning the government or engaging in judicial proceedings. The court determined that the law firms' communications and conduct in initiating arbitration for their clients were related to judicial proceedings and constituted protected petitioning activity on matters of public concern, specifically alleged antitrust and consumer protection violations. Furthermore, the court found that Valve failed to establish an exception to UPEPA and that Valve's claims failed as a matter of law. Crucially, the court held that the law firms' actions were protected by the litigation privilege, which grants attorneys immunity for communications related to judicial proceedings. The court reasoned that the law firms' conduct was pertinent and material to the relief sought for their clients and that disciplinary avenues, such as sanctions or professional conduct proceedings, were available to address any alleged misconduct. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded for dismissal of Valve's claims. ♦

M.G. v. Bainbridge Island School Distr. #303, 2025 WL 892770 (Wash.App., March 24, 2025).
♦ This Washington Court of Appeals case, M.G. v. Bainbridge Island School Distr. #303, involves a lawsuit brought by M.G., Samantha Gerlach, and Suzanne Gerlach against the Bainbridge Island School District, Washington State HOSA, Naszya Bradshaw, and Eleanor Wilson, stemming from social media posts and related events in 2020 and 2021 concerning allegations of sexual assault involving Bainbridge High School students, including M.G.. The court addresses the application of Washington's Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), an anti-SLAPP law, to the case. The trial court granted Eleanor Wilson's and Naszya Bradshaw's joint UPEPA motion, dismissing all claims against them. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of claims against Wilson and Bradshaw, finding that their social media posts addressed a matter of public concern (sexual assault allegations and the school's response) and that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of defamation or demonstrate that any UPEPA exceptions applied. ♦

Thurman v. Cowles Co., 2024 WL 119333 (Wash.App., Jan. 11, 2024).
♦ This Washington Court of Appeals case, Thurman v. Cowles Co., concerns the application of the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), designed to expedite dismissal of lawsuits targeting free speech. Thurman sued Cowles (publisher of the Spokesman-Review) for defamation and invasion of privacy after an article about his firing from the Sheriff's department. The court addressed several key issues: (1) Retroactivity of UPEPA: The court held that UPEPA applies to causes of action asserted on or after its effective date, even if the initial complaint was filed earlier. This means Thurman's amended defamation claim, though part of a pre-UPEPA lawsuit, fell under the Act. (2) Timeliness of UPEPA motions: Filing an amended complaint restarts the 60-day clock for filing a UPEPA motion for new claims, so Cowles' motion was timely. (3) Conflict with Court Rules: The court found that where UPEPA's procedural rules conflict with Washington Supreme Court rules (specifically regarding discovery and appeals), the court rules prevail. The UPEPA's automatic right of appeal from a partial denial of expedited relief was deemed inconsistent with existing appellate rules. (4) Constitutional Challenges: Thurman's constitutional challenges to UPEPA (access to courts, equal protection) were rejected. The court found that the UPEPA's temporary discovery stay didn't violate access to courts, and that the Act's differential treatment of plaintiffs and defendants in defamation cases involving public concern was rationally related to its purpose of protecting free speech. (5) CPA Claim and Attorney Fees: The court affirmed the dismissal of Thurman's Consumer Protection Act (CPA) claim, finding it barred by the First Amendment. The court remanded the case for consideration of Cowles' UPEPA motion regarding the defamation claim and ordered Cowles to receive attorney fees and costs related to the successful dismissal of the CPA claim. Further fees and costs will be awarded if Cowles prevails on the defamation claim. ♦

Torchstar Corp., Hyatech, Inc., 2023 WL 137762 (E.D.Wa., Jan. 9, 2023).
♦ Torchstar Corp. sued Hyatech, Inc. for copyright infringement and unfair competition related to the sale of LED products on Amazon. Hyatech counterclaimed for tortious interference, alleging Torchstar falsely accused them of infringement to get their products delisted from Amazon. Torchstar moved to dismiss Hyatech's counterclaim under Washington's anti-SLAPP statute (UPEPA), arguing their actions were protected petitioning. The court denied Torchstar's motion. It found the Noerr-Pennington doctrine (protecting petitioning of government) inapplicable to Torchstar's complaints to Amazon, a private entity. However, the court also found genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Torchstar's lawsuit constituted "sham litigation," preventing dismissal of Hyatech's counterclaim. The court determined that Hyatech had stated a valid cause of action and that there were genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Therefore, the court denied Torchstar's motion to strike and awarded no attorney's fees. ♦

Jha v. Khan, 2022 WL 16918101 (Wash.App., Div. 1, Nov. 14, 2022).
♦ This Washington Court of Appeals case, Jha v. Khan, concerns the first appellate application of the Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), a law designed to prevent Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs). Siddharth Jha, a property developer, sued Varisha Khan, a political candidate, for invasion of privacy by false light based on statements Khan made about Jha in her campaign materials. These statements referenced a prior lawsuit against Jha alleging abuse and revenge porn. Khan moved to dismiss under UPEPA. The trial court denied the motion, finding material facts in dispute. The appeals court reversed. The court held that UPEPA applied because Khan's statements, made in a political campaign article criticizing her opponent, were on a matter of public concern. The court then found that Jha failed to establish a prima facie case of invasion of privacy by false light because he didn't prove Khan's statements were false. The court reasoned that the statement about the lawsuit was true, and the statement about Jha disregarding public transparency was an opinion. Furthermore, the court found Khan's statements were protected by the fair reporting privilege, as they were a fair abridgement of the New York lawsuit. Finally, the court held that the trial court erred by allowing Jha to amend his complaint after Khan's UPEPA motion was filed, as this violated the automatic stay provision of UPEPA. The case was reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss Jha's claims with prejudice and award Khan attorney fees and costs at both the trial and appellate levels. ♦

Al-Albustani v. Alger, 2022 WL 3213331 (W.D.Wa., Aug. 9, 2022).
♦ Al-Albustani v. Alger, 2022 WL 3213331 (W.D.Wa., Aug. 9, 2022). (1) Background: Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made false and defamatory statements about him on a radio show, claiming he murdered his wife. Plaintiff sued Defendant for copyright infringement, violation of the Washington Personality Rights Act (WPRA), invasion of privacy by false light, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. (2) Defendant's Motion: Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under the Washington Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), which is Washington's anti-SLAPP law. Defendant argued that her statements were opinions and that she did not mention Plaintiff by name. (3) Court's Ruling: The court granted Defendant's motion in part and denied it in part. Copyright Infringement: The court dismissed this claim with prejudice because Plaintiff abandoned it. WPRA: The court dismissed this claim without prejudice because Plaintiff failed to allege that Defendant used the deceased's name for advertising purposes. Plaintiff was given leave to amend this claim. Invasion of Privacy by False Light: The court denied the motion because Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Defendant's statements were false and highly offensive. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: The court denied the motion because Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Defendant's statements were outrageous. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: The court denied the motion because Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Defendant's statements caused him emotional distress. (4) Key Takeaways: The court applied a two-pronged standard for UPEPA motions: If the motion challenges the legal sufficiency of a claim, the court applies the Rule 12(b)(6) standard; If the motion challenges the factual sufficiency of a claim, the court applies the Rule 56 standard and allows discovery. The court found that even opinion statements can be actionable under false light if they falsely express or imply provable facts about the plaintiff. The court found that a single, outrageous statement on a nationally syndicated radio show can be sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court found that PTSD can be sufficient to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. ♦

Project Veritas v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 2022 WL 1555047 (W.D.Wa., May 17, 2022).
♦ Project Veritas sued Stanford University and the University of Washington for defamation, alleging that they published a blog post and collaborated with the New York Times to discredit a Project Veritas video about alleged voter fraud. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice. It found that the statements in the blog post and subsequent New York Times articles were non-actionable opinions protected by the First Amendment, not factual assertions that could be proven false. The court applied Washington's anti-SLAPP statute (UPEPA) to Stanford's motion to dismiss, but not to the University of Washington's, finding that UPEPA did not apply to governmental entities. Subsequently, the court granted Stanford's motion for attorney's fees under UPEPA, awarding them $149,596.90. ♦