Site: Appeal Uniform Public Expression Protection Act

A state should insert a time to appeal consistent with other interlocutory appeals.

This section may require amendment of a state's interlocutory appeal statute or court rule.

"If the defendant were required to wait until final judgment to appeal the denial of a meritorious anti-SLAPP motion, a decision by this court reversing the district court's denial of the motion would not remedy the fact that the defendant had been compelled to defend against a meritless claim brought to chill rights of free expression. Thus, [anti-SLAPP statutes] protect the defendant from the burdens of trial, not merely from ultimate judgments of liability." Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2003) (superseded by statute on unrelated grounds as stated in Fyk v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-16232, 2020 WL 3124258, at *2 (9th Cir. June 12, 2020)).

This section should not be construed to foreclose an interlocutory appeal of an order granting, in whole or in part, a motion under Section 3, if state law would otherwise permit such an appeal.

This section is not intended to affect any separate writ procedure a state may have.

This section is not intended to prevent a court from entering an order certifying a question or otherwise permitting an immediate appeal of an order that dismisses only part of a claim.

A party who chooses not to interlocutorily appeal under this section should not be foreclosed from filing an ordinary, non-interlocutory appeal of a court's denial of a motion under Section 3 following the entry of a final, appealable judgment.